Introduction
Prior to September 11, 2001 , internal strife and drug trafficking increased immensely in Colombia. After September 11, 2001 , the same trend began in Mexicomostly evident in drug cartel violence. The problem has escalated rapidly since 2006 after Mexico's most recent presidential election. Both these countries-especially Mexico, which shares a 3,000 mile border with the United States-present a security threat to the United States. Since 9/11, the United States has tightened its borders. The newly created Department of Homeland Security has given border security a higher priority by providing equipment, intelligence, and personnel as part of a new initiative in the security plan.
To fulfill the President's vision, the State Department has taken the lead to avert any further deterioration in Colombia and Mexico by executing two plans: Plan Colombia (1999-present) and the Mérida Initiative to aid Mexico and Central America (2008-present) . But are these plans successful? Are they meeting the US objectives?
Are these southern neighbors more secure? Is the US more secure? Should Plan Colombia, given its longevity, be the model for Mexico and any other state or non-state entity with similar characteristics?
This SRP discusses the plans individually. It explains how they were devised and points out their differences. It considers whether Plan Colombia should be the model for Mexico, since the Mérida Initiative is still in its infancy stages. It concludes with recommendations for strengthening the Mérida Initiative.
In this SRP, the term "terrorist" refers both to narcotic traffickers and other groups who aim to overturn the governing bodies and principals in their own country or in countries they have targeted.
US Interests
Cooperation with Mexico will be a key factor to stability and security for the United States. Mexico, just like Canada, has very strategic importance to the United States in both commerce and national security due to proximity. The border shared by Mexico and United States extends over 3,000 miles. In Mexico, transnational criminal threats and threats to governance continue to grow at a rampant rate; this disruption spills over onto sovereign US territory. These national security challenges undermine stability, delegitimize government institutions, and cause fear amongst the population.
As transnational criminal organizations accrue enormous wealth through drugs, weapons, and human trafficking, they are infiltrating and corrupting the US way of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness and imposing crime and disorder among the United States, neighboring countries, and partners abroad. In addition, terrorists use criminal networking for their logistical requirements, so they undermine the international financial system and cost consumers billions of dollars annually by compromising US security measures.
To counter this security challenge, President Obama has identified five major pillars in the National Security Strategy based on "shared efforts to indentify and interdict threats:" Deny hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders; Maintain Effective Control of our physical borders; Safeguard lawful trade and travel into and out of the US; Disrupt and Dismantle transnational terrorist, and criminal organizations; and Ensure Our National Resilience in the face of the threat and hazard. 1 It is imperative for the United States to refocus attention from the Middle East to their Southern border and Central America to address this security challenge in its own backyard. If the focus is readjusted, the success close to home will in turn complement the efforts abroad of denying and disrupting terrorists worldwide. Central America along with Colombia and Mexico are major suppliers of drugs to the United States. Disrupting their logistical supply chains and distribution centers will create a tremendous ripple effect across the terrorist network by disrupting their movement of goods and cutting into their profits. They will have less to spend on bribes, weapons, supplies, and traveling venues.
However, these terrorists are very resilient and very adaptable to changing environments. So these disruptions will cause only temporary setbacks. But continuous disruptions create pressure by forcing networks to increase their spending on operating and set-up costs at different locations. Disruption also complicates communication within the network, which in turn causes turmoil within. Continual pressure on the networks is disruptive. These pressures could cause the organization to implode, thereby increasing security within the United States and abroad.
Plan Colombia
In 1999, the Government of Colombia developed a $7.5 billion program to reshape its country. President Andrés Pastrana supported this plan by committing $4 billion; he pleaded with the international community to provide the additional funding of $3.5 billion. The plan, dubbed Plan Colombia, focused on four main areas: "promoting the peace process; combating the narcotics industry; reviving the Colombian economy; and provided an aggressive offensive on the FARC to take back territories that were considered FARC strongholds. Violence decreased, but the cartels simply adapted and the cocaine production did not falter. After auditing the performance of Plan Colombia, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) in 2008 determined that Plan Colombia did not fully meet the specified goals, but nevertheless increased the elected government's presence and increased security in the country. The GAO determined the goal of a 50 percent reduction in drugs was almost achieved, but now the drug trade has again increased. This is not necessarily due to the failure of the Plan, but due to the resilience of the drug cartels.
Also, US Agency for International Development (USAID) programs are not currently able to infiltrate the areas of concern to fully develop their overall objectives of the programs. Once these areas are accessible and safe to operate in, USAID will be able to deliver programs throughout the country and actually make contact with the most oppressed and vulnerable citizens to avoid their recruitment into the cartels' activities.
Significant strides have been made throughout the country in security and training, which has significantly reduced FARC and AUC profits as well as their overall strength. To counter the additional training and equipment that the Colombian security forces have obtained, the FARC in particular has changed its tactics and now avoids contact with Colombian officials. 11 In addition, a USAID and Colombian government program has offered members of the FARC and AUC the chance to leave the organization in exchange for information and minimal punishments for their crimes. As a result, many insurgents have signed up to reintegrate into society to work for the good of the country. Unfortunately, this process is proceeding very slowly as the judicial system is being rebuilt. Persistent corruption continues to hinder the process. Despite these obstacles, the FARC has had a significant decline in their end strength numbers.
In 2001, the FARC had an estimated 17,000 members. As of 2008, they are at 8,000 or less. In addition, a governmental counter-drug initiative has dropped their profit per kilogram of cocaine by more than one hundred dollars.
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Also, a peace accord with the AUC was reached with the Government of Colombia, requiring them to demobilize and lay down their arms. 13 This accord appears to be a great success; however, noting the very slow reintegration of former members of the FARC and AUC, the GAO has discovered that former AUC members have turned toward "regional criminal bands." The number of these bands has grown from 3,000 to 9,000 members with a majority of them former AUC members. 14 With this growth gang rivalries have increased. The current uptick in homicides and kidnappings has been linked to gang activities.
Despite the hurdles that still need to be overcome-corruption, human rights issues, and governing in all areas of the country-Plan Colombia has been very much a success. However, persistence is essential in this continuous struggle with terrorism and drug cartels. No matter how powerful a government is, it will never have the resources and networking that terrorist networks and drug cartels have developed.
These types of organizations will move and adapt and continue. But the success for the government lies in its on-going ability to disrupt them and keep them on the movehopefully to move out of country. But their movements then present a problem to the neighboring countries. Therefore, collaboration is needed to secure a region. crossing the border illegally," and with weapons from "over 12,000 gun shops between Mexico, Arizona and Texas, coming from the United States and feeding into organized crime," 21 the United States appears to be a significant part of the problem. Over 90 percent of the homicide weapons in Mexico can be linked back to the United States. 22 After taking this hard look, the United States has developed the National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy which outlines in further detail how the National Security Strategy will be executed. This document focuses on six areas that complement the Mérida Initiative:
The President's National Drug Control Strategy seeks to disrupt the illicit drug industry as close to the source as possible. This Strategy aims to improve Federal counterdrug efforts on the Southwest Border in the following areas: intelligence collection and information sharing, interdiction at and between ports of entry, aerial surveillance and interdiction of smuggling aircraft, investigations and prosecutions, countering financial crime, and cooperation with Mexico. 23 Because of the perception that this initiative has stalled, based on allegations of human rights violations and the "slow rolling" of money from the State Department, in The nature of the foe: Colombia's decades-long conflict with the FARC rebel group and with powerful drug cartels is motivated, at least on the rebel side, by a Marxist ideology aimed at overthrowing the state. In Mexico, the drug war is motivated by the cartels' basic goal of moving narcotics into the US without government interference, and collecting profits.
Targets and tactics: Terrorist-style attacks have occurred in Mexico's drug war (a remote controlled car bomb in Ciudad Juarez, a grenade attack on civilians in Michoacan) but they have not occurred with the frequency and scope as such tactics in Colombia. The Mexico drug war is mostly a conflict between feuding cartel groups. 24 To understand that one country's battle is about an ideology while the other one is about profit is a significant factor in determining the appropriate strategy for a country's future. The United States cannot approach an enemy with the same strategy, especially when the enemies have very different motivations. In addition, the tactics need to be assessed in order to understand how the war is being fought and who is the enemy. In Colombia, the FARC and AUC are trying to undermine security in populous cities. In Mexico, even though they use similar terrorist-style tactics, the targets are other cartel groups. But they have little sympathy for civilian causalities, which are considered collateral damage. Unlike Beyond Mérida as currently constituted, incorporating the above elements provides a holistic approach to this national security issue. It provides a strategy for aggressively targeting the drug cartels, restoring order and security. In addition, the soft strategy of this initiative provides for rebuilding communities to break the cycle of the youth thinking they have "zero choices." Committing economic resources to rebuild the social infrastructure in targeted border communities will keep a vulnerable group from aiding the cartels.
30
Furthermore, this strategy does not allow for withholding funds and resources on the basis of narrow human rights judgments. However, it demands progress, cooperation, and collaboration from the Mexican government. It accepts that there will be setbacks and practices that may not be aligned with US values.
This strategy along with any other strategy still entails some risk. However, the risk is relatively small in respect to national security on the Southern border. Human rights violations in Mexico based on US standards will have to be tolerated by the US government in the short-term. The United States will have to set aside judgment as the Mexican government continues to purge the corruption and instill the values of proper conduct while enforcing their laws and constitution. In addition, the commitment of monetary aid supporting both resources and manpower will be competing against well established commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hard choices will have to be made by the Obama Administration and Congress to ensure the right focus and aid is directed to protect the Southern border. This commitment is pivotal in building a joint task with a solid foundation between governments that last well beyond defined presidential terms.
Conclusion
The Beyond Mérida needs to be furthered refined to fit Mexico's situation similar to where after several revisions Plan Colombia as currently constituted works for Colombia. Even though one of their commonalities are centered around the target enemy which uses drugs as their source of power and money, the two enemies' political and economical agendas are completely different. When enemies have different political agendas, it is unproductive to apply the same tactics to defeat and disrupt their operations. However, lessons learned from Plan Colombia are invaluable and should be applied appropriately to shape the Mérida Initiative for future success.
Overall, the US support to Mexico is on the right track, but only in the context of further refinements to the Beyond Mérida. The State Department and the inter-agencies should continue the forward press on implementing programs and delivering monetary aid. The United States needs to be more understanding and willing to accept some setbacks. But the United States should not turn a blind eye; rather it should attempt to correct those setbacks without disrupting a partnership that is pivotal in correcting the situation. The United States should exercise oversight, but not be overbearing.
If the United States does not fully commit to this issue, then the drug cartels will likely continue to prosper and disrupt with impunity. If this trend continues the United
States may see an increase in security threats from the Southern border and may not be able to protect the security of US border towns. If this national security issue is not positively addressed, it will likely become a larger national burden.
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